Nonne ecce pleni sunt vetustatis suae qui nobis dicunt: Quid faciebat deus, antequam faceret caelum et terram? si enim vacabat, inquiunt, et non operabatur aliquid, cur non sic semper et deinceps, quemadmodum retro semper cessavit ab opere? si enim ullus motus in deo novus extitit et voluntas nova, ut creaturam conderet, quam numquam ante condiderat, quomodo iam vera aeternitas, ubi oritur voluntas, quae non erat? neque enim voluntas dei creatura est, sed ante creaturam, quia non crearetur aliquid, nisi creatoris voluntas praecederet. ad ipsam ergo dei substantiam pertinet voluntas eius. quod si exortum est aliquid in dei substantia, quod prius non erat, non veraciter dicitur aeterna illa substantia; si autem dei voluntas sempiterna erat, ut esset creatura, cur non sempiterna et creatura?
Qui haec dicunt, nondum te intellegunt, o sapientia dei, lux mentium, nondum intellegunt, quomodo fiant, quae per te atque in te fiunt, et conantur aeterna sapere, sed adhuc in praeteritis et futuris rerum motibus cor eorum volitat et adhuc vanum est. quis tenebit illud et figet illud, ut paululum stet, et paululum rapiat splendorem semper stantis aeternitatis, et comparet cum temporibus numquam stantibus, et videat esse incomparabilem: et videat longum tempus nisi ex multis praetereuntibus motibus, qui siuml extendi non possunt, longum non fieri; non autem praeterire quicquam in aeterno, sed totum esse praesens; nullum vero tempus totum esse praesens: et videat omne praeteritum propelli ex futuro, et omne futurum ex praeterito consequi, et omne praeteritum ac futurum ab eo, quod semper est praesens, creari et excurrere? quis tenebit cor hominis, ut stet et videat, quomodo stans dictet futura et praeterita tempora nec futura nec praeterita aeternitas? numquid manus mea valet hoc aut manus oris mei per loquellas agit tam grandem rem?
Ecce respondeo dicenti: quid faciebat deus, antequam faceret caelum et terram? respondeo non illud, quod quidam respondisse perhibetur ioculariter eludens quaestionis violentiam: alta, inquit, scrutantibus gehennas parabat. aliud est videre, aliud ridere haec non respondeo. libentius enim responderim: nescio, quod nescio quam illud, unde irridetur qui alta interrogavit et laudatur qui falsa respondit. sed dico te, deus noster, omnis creaturae creatorem, et si caeli et terrae nomine omnis creatura intellegitur, audenter dico: antequam faceret deus caelum et terram, non faciebat aliquid. si enim faciebat, quid nisi creaturam faciebat? et utinam sic sciam, quidquid utiliter scire cupio, quemadmodum scio, quod nulla fiebat creatura, antequam fieret ulla creatura.
At si cuiusquam volatilis sensum vagatur per imagines retro temporum, et te, deum omnipotentem et omnicreantem et omnitenentem, caeli et terrae artificem, ab opere tanto, antequam id faceres, per innumerabilia saecula cessasse miratur, evigilet atque adtendat, quia falsa miratur. nam unde poterant innumerabilia saecula praeterire, quae ipse non feceras, cum sis omnium saeculorum auctor et conditor? aut quae tempora fuissent, quae abs te condita non essent? aut quomodo praeterirent, si numquam fuissent? cum ergo sis operator omnium temporum, si fuit aliquod tempus, antequam faceres caelum et terram, cur dicitur, quod ab opere cessabas? id ipsum enim tempus tu feceras, nec praeterire potuerunt tempora, antequam faceres tempora. si autem ante caelum et terram nullum erat tempus, cur quaeritur, quid tunc faciebas? non enim erat tunc, ubi non erat tempus. Nec tu tempore tempora praecedis: alioquin non omnia tempora praecederes. sed praecedis omnia praeterita celsitudine semper praesentis aeternitatis, et superas omnia futura, quia illa futura sunt, et cum venerint, praeterita erunt; tu autem idem ipse es, et anni tui non deficient. anni tui nec eunt nec veniunt: isti autem nostri eunt et veniunt, ut omnes veniant. anni tui omnes simul stant, quoniam stant, nec euntes a venientibus excluduntur, quia non transeunt: isti autem nostri omnes erunt, cum omnes non erunt. anni tui dies unus, et dies tuus non cotidie, sed hodie, quia hodiernus tuus non cedit crastino; neque enim succedit hesterno. hodiernus tuus aeternitas: ideo coaeternum genuisti, cui dixisti: ego hodie genui te. omnia tempora tu fecisti et ante omnia tempora tu es, nec aliquo tempore non erat tempus.
Nullo ergo tempore non feceras aliquid, quia ipsum tempus tu feceras. et nulla tempora tibi coaeterna sunt, quia tu permanes; at illa si permanerent, non essent tempora. quid est enim tempus? quis hoc facile breviterque explicaverit? quis hoc ad verbum de illo proferendum vel cogitatione comprehenderit? quid autem familiarius et notius in loquendo conmemoramus quam tempus? et intellegimus utique, cum id loquimur, intellegimus etiam, cum alio loquente id audimus. quid est ergo tempus? si nemo ex me quaerat, scio; si quaerenti explicare velim, nescio: fidenter tamen dico scire me, quod, si nihil praeteriret, non esset praeteritum tempus, et si nihil adveniret, non esset futurum tempus, et si nihil esset, non esset praesens tempus. duo ergo illa tempora, praeteritum et futurum, quomodo sunt, quando et praeteritum iam non est et futurum nondum est? praesens autem si semper esset praesens nec in praeteritum transiret, non iam esset tempus, sed aeternitas. si ergo praesens, ut tempus sit, ideo fit, quia in praeteritum transit, quomodo et hoc esse dicimus, cui causa, ut sit, illa est, quia non erit, ut scilicet non vere dicamus tempus esse, nisi quia tendit non esse.
Et tamen dicimus longum tempus et breve tempus, neque hoc nisi de praeterito aut futuro dicimus. praeteritum tempus longum, verbi gratia, vocamus ante centum annos, futurum itidem longum post centum annos, breve futurum post decem dies. sed quo pacto longum est aut breve, quod non est? praeteritum enim iam non est, et futurum nondum est. non itaque dicamus: longum est, sed dicamus de praeterito: longum fuit, et de futuro: longum erit. domine meus, lux mea, nonne et hic veritas tua deridebit hominem? quod enim longum fuit praeteritum tempus cum iam esset praeteritum, longum fuit, an ante, cum adhuc praesens esset? tunc enim poterat esse longum, quando erat, quod esset longum: praeteritum vero iam non erat; unde nec longum esse poterat, quod omnino non erat. non ergo dicamus: longum fuit praeteritum tempus; neque enim inveniemus, quid fuerit longum, quando, ex quo praeteritum est, non est, sed dicamus: longum fuit illud praesens tempus, quia cum praesens esset, longum erat. nondum enim praeterierat, ut non esset, et ideo erat, quod longum esse posset; postea vero quam praeteriit, simul et longum esse destitit, quod esse destitit. Videamus ergo, anima humana, utrum praesens tempus possit esse longum: datum enim tibi est sentire moras atque metiri. quid respondebis mihi? an centum anni praesentes longum tempus est? vide prius, utrum possint praesentes esse centum anni. si enim primus eorum annus agitur, ipse praesens est, nonaginta vero et novem futuri sunt, et ideo nondum sunt: si autem secundus annus agitur, iam unus est praeteritus, alter praesens, ceteri futuri. atque ita mediorum quemlibet centenarii huius numeri annum praesentem posuerimus: ante illum praeteriti erunt, post illum futuri. quocirca centum anni praesentes esse non poterunt. vide saltem, utrum qui agitur mensis, futuri sunt ceteri, si secundus, iam et primus praeteriit et reliqui nondum sunt. ergo nec annus, qui agitur, totus est praesens, et si non totus est praesens, non annus est praesens. duodecim enim menses annus est, quorum quilibet unus mensis, qui agitur, ipse praesens est, ceteri aut praeteriti aut futuri. quamquam neque mensis, qui agitur, praesens est, sed unus dies: si primus, futuris ceteris, si novissimus, praeteritis ceteris, si mediorum quilibet, inter praeteritos et futuros. Ecce praesens tempus, quod solum inveniebamus longum appellandum, vix ad unius diei spatium contractum est. sed discutiamus etiam ipsum, quia nec unus dies totus est praesens. nocturnis enim et diurnis horis omnibus viginti quattuor expletur, quarum prima ceteras futuras habet, novissima praeteritas, aliqua vero interiectarum ante se praeteritas, post se futuras. et ipsa una hora fugitivis particulis agitur: quidquid eius avolavit, praeteritum est, quidquid ei restat, futurum. si quid intellegitur temporis, quod in nullas iam vel minutissimas momentorum partes dividi possit, id solum est, quod praesens dicatur; quod tamen ita raptim a futuro in praeteritum transvolat, ut nulla morula extendatur. nam si extenditur, dividitur in praeteritum et futurum: praesens autem nullum habet spatium. ubi est ergo tempus, quod longum dicamus? an futurum? non quidem dicimus: longum est, quia nondum est quod longum sit, sed dicimus: longum erit. quando igitur erit? si enim et tunc adhuc futurum erit, non erit longum, quia quid sit longum nondum erit: si autem tunc erit longum, cum ex futuro quod nondum est esse iam coeperit et praesens factum erit, ut possit esse quod longum sit, iam superioribus vocibus clamat praesens tempus longum se esse non posse.
Et tamen, domine, sentimus intervalla temporum, et comparamus sibimet, et dicimus alia longiora et alia breviora. metimur etiam, quanto sit longius aut brevius illud tempus quam illud, et respondemus duplum esse hoc vel triplum, illud autem simplum aut tantum hoc esse quantum illud. sed praetereuntia metimur tempora, cum sentiendo metimur; praeterita vero, quae iam non sunt, aut futura, quae nondum sunt, quis metiri potest, nisi forte audebit quid dicere metiri posse quod non est? cum ergo praeterit tempus, sentiri et metiri potest, cum autem praeterierit, quoniam non est, non potest.
Quaero, pater, non adfirmo: deus meus, praeside mihi et rege me. quisnam est, qui dicat mihi non esse tria tempora, sicut pueri didicimus puerosque docuimus, praeteritum, praesens et futurum, sed tantum praesens, quoniam illa duo non sunt? an et ipsa sunt, sed ex aliquo procedit occulto, cum ex futuro fit praesens, et in aliquod recedit occultum, cum ex praesenti fit praeteritum? nam ubi ea viderunt qui futura cecinerunt, si nondum sunt? neque enim potest videri id quod non est, et qui narrant praeterita, non utique vera narrarent, si animo illa non cernerent: quae si nulla essent, cerni omnino non possent. sunt ergo et futura et praeterita.
Sine me, domine, amplius quaerere, spes mea; non conturbetur intentio mea. si enim sunt futura et praeterita, volo scire, ubi sint. quod si nondum valeo, scio tamen, ubicumque sunt, non ibi ea futura esse aut praeterita, sed praesentia. nam si et ibi futura sunt, nondum ibi sunt, si et ibi praeterita sunt, iam non ibi sunt. ubicumque ergo sunt, quaecumque sunt, non sunt nisi praesentia. quamquam praeterita cum vera narrantur, ex memoria proferuntur non res ipsae, quae praeterierunt, sed verba concepta ex imaginibus earum, quae in animo velut vestigia per sensus praetereundo fixerunt. pueritia quippe mea, quae iam non est, in tempore praeterito est, quod iam non est; imaginem vero eius, cum eam recolo et narro, in praesenti tempore intueor, quia est adhuc in memoria mea. utrum similis sit causa etiam praedicendorum futurorum, ut rerum, quae nondum sunt, iam exsistentes praesentiantur imagines, confiteor, deus meus, nescio. illud sane scio, nos plerumque praemeditari futuras actiones nostras eamque praemeditationem esse praesentem, actionem autem, quam praemeditamur, nondum esse, quia futura est; quam cum aggressi fuerimus et quod praemeditabamur agere coeperimus, tunc erit illa actio, quia tunc non futura, sed praesens erit. Quoquo modo se itaque habeat arcana praesensio futurorum, videri nisi quod est non potest. quod autem iam est, non futurum sed praesens est. cum ergo videri dicuntur futura, non ipsa, quae nondum sunt, id est quae futura sunt, sed eorum causae vel signa forsitan videntur, quae iam sunt: ideo non futura, sed praesentia sunt iam videntibus, ex quibus futura praedicantur animo concepta. quae rursus conceptiones iam sunt, et eas praesentes apud se intuentur qui illa praedicunt. loquatur mihi aliquod exemplum tanta rerum numerositas. intueor auroram: oriturum solem praenuntio. quod intueor, praesens est, quod praenuntio, futurum: non sol futurus, qui iam est, sed ortus eius, qui nondum est: tamen etiam ortum ipsum nisi animo imaginarer, sicut modo cum id loquor, non eum possem praedicere. sed nec illa aurora, quam in caelo video, solis ortus est, quamvis eum praecedat, nec illa imaginatio in animo meo: quae duo praesentia cernuntur, ut futurus ille ante dicatur. futura ergo nondum sunt, et si nondum sunt, non sunt, et si non sunt, videri omnino non possunt; sed praedici possunt ex praesentibus, quae iam sunt et videntur.
Tu itaque, regnator creaturae tuae, quis est modus, quo doces animas ea quae futura sunt? docuisti enim prophetas tuos. quisnam ille modus est, quo doces futura, cui futurum quicquam non est? vel potius de futuris doces praesentia? nam quod non est, nec doceri utique potest. nimis longe est modus iste ab acie mea; invaluit: ex me non potero ad illum; potero autem ex te, cum dederis tu, dulce lumen occultorum oculorum meorum.
Quod autem nunc liquet et claret, nec futura sunt nec praeterita, nec proprie dicitur: tempora sunt tria, praeteritum, praesens et futurum, sed fortasse proprie diceretur: tempora sunt tria, praesens de praeteritis, praesens de praesentibus, praesens de futuris. sunt enim haec in anima tria quaedam, et alibi ea non video praesens de praeteritis memoria, praesens de praesentibus contuitus, praesens de futuris expectatio. si haec permittimur dicere, tria tempora video fateorque, tria sunt. dicatur etiam: tempora sunt tria, praeteritum, praesens, et futurum, sicut abutitur consuetudo; dicatur. ecce non curo nec resisto nec reprehendo, dum tamen intellegatur quod dicitur, neque id, quod futurum est, esse iam, neque id, quod praeteritum est. pauca sunt enim, quae proprie loquimur, plura non proprie, sed agnoscitur quid velimus.
Dixi ergo paulo ante, quod praetereuntia tempora metimur, ut possimus dicere duplum esse hoc temporis ad illud simplum, aut tantum hoc quantum illud, et si quid aliud de partibus temporum possumus renuntiare metiendo. quocirca, ut dicebam, praetereuntia metimur tempora; et si quis mihi dicat: unde scis? respondebam: scio, quia metimur, nec metiri quae non sunt possumus, et non sunt praeterita vel futura. praesens vero tempus quomodo metimur, quando non habet spatium? metitur ergo, cum praeterit, cum autem praeterierit, non metitur; quid enim metiatur, non erit. sed unde et qua et quo praeterit cum metitur? unde nisi ex futuro? qua nisi per praesens? quo nisi in praeteritum? ex illo ergo, quod nondum est, per illud, quod spatio caret, in illud, quod iam non est. quid autem metimur nisi tempus in aliquo spatio? neque enim dicimus simpla et dupla et tripla et aequalia et si quid hoc modo in tempore dicimus nisi spatia temporum. in quo ergo spatio metimur tempus praeteriens? utrum in futuro, unde praeterit? sed quod nondum est, non metimur. an in praesenti, qua praeterit? sed nullum spatium non metimur. an in praeterito, quo praeterit? sed quod iam non est, non metimur.
Exarsit animus meus nosse istuc inplicatissimum aenigma. noli claudere, domine deus meus, bone pater, per Christum obsecro, noli claudere desiderio meo ista et usitata et abdita, quominus in ea penetret; et dilucescant, allucente misericordia tua, domine. quem percontabor de his? et cui fructuosius confitebor inperitiam meam nisi tibi, cui non sunt molesta studia mea flammantia vehementer in scripturas tuas? da quod amo: amo enim, et hoc tu dedisti. da, pater, qui vere nosti data bona dare filiis tuis, da, quoniam suscepi cognoscere; et labor est ante me, donec aperias. per Christum obsecro, in nomine eius sancti sanctorum, nemo mihi obstrepat. et ego credidi, propter quod et loquor. haec est spes mea; ad hanc vivo, ut contempler delectationem domini. ecce veteres posuisti dies meos, et transeunt, et quomodo, nescio. et dicimus tempus et tempus, tempora et tempora: quamdiu dixit hoc ille, quamdiu fecit hoc ille et: quam longo tempore illud non vidi et: duplum temporis habet haec syllaba ad illam simplam brevem. dicimus haec et audivimus haec et intellegimur et intellegimus. manifestissima et usitatissima sunt, et eadem rursus nimis latent, et nova est inventio eorum.
Audivi a quodam homine docto, quod solis et lunae ac siderum motus ipsa sint tempora, et non adnui. cur enim non potius omnium corporum motus sint tempora? an vero, si cessarent caeli lumina et moveretur rota figuli, non esset tempus, quo metiremur eos gyros, et diceremus aut aequalibus morulis agi, aut si alias tardius, alias velocius moveretur, alios magis diuturnos esse, alios minus? aut cum haec diceremus, non et nos in tempore loqueremur, aut essent in verbis nostris aliae longae syllabae, aliae breves, nisi quia illae longiore tempore soniussent, istae breviore? deus, dona hominibus videre in parvo communes notitias rerum parvarum atque magnarum. sunt sidera et luminaria caeli in signis et in temporibus et in diebus et in annis. sunt vero; sed nec ego dixerim circuitum illius ligneolae rotae diem esse, nec tamen ideo tempus non esse ille dixerit. Ego scire cupio vim naturamque temporis, quo metimur corporum motus, et dicimus illum motum verbi gratia tempore duplo esse diuturniorem quam istum. nam quaero, quoniam dies dicitur non tantum mora solis super terram, secundum quod aliud est dies, aliud nox, sed etiam totius eius circuitus ab oriente usque orientem, secundum quod dicimus: tot dies transierunt -- cum suis enim noctibus dicuntur tot dies, nec extra reputantur spatia noctium -- quoniam ergo dies expletur motu solis atque circuitu ab oriente usque ad orientem, quaero, utrum motus ipse sit dies, an mora ipsa, quanta peragitur, an utrumque. si enim primum dies esset, dies ergo esset, etiamsi tanto spatio temporis sol cursum illum peregisset, quantum est horae unius. si secundum, non ergo esset dies, si ab ortu solis usque in ortum alterum tam brevis mora esset, quam est horae unius, sed viciens et quater circuiret sol, ut expleret diem. si utrumque, nec ille appellaretur dies, si horae spatio sol totum suum gyrum circumiret, nec ille, se sole cessante tantum temporis praeteriret, quanto peragere sol totum ambitum de mane in mane adsolet. non itaque nunc quaeram, quid sit illud, quod vocatur dies, sed quid sit tempus, quo metientes solis circuitum diceremus eum dimidio spatio temporis peractum minus quam solet, si tanto spatio temporis peractus esset, quanto peraguntur horae duodecim, et utrumque tempus conparantes diceremus illud simplum, hoc duplum, etiamsi aliquando illo simplo, aliquando isto duplo sol ab oriente usque orientem corcuiret. nemo ergo mihi dicat caelestium corporum motus esse tempora, quia et cuiusdam voto cum sol stetisset, ut victoriosum proelium perageret, sol stabat, sed tempus ibat: per suum quippe spatium temporis, quod ei sufficeret, illa pugna gesta atque finita est. video igitur quandam esse distentionem. sed video? an videre mihi videor? tu demonstrabis, lux, veritas.
Iubes ut adprobem, si quis dicat tempus esse motum corporis? non iubes. nam corpus nullum nisi in tempore moveri audio: tu dicis. ipsum autem corporis motum tempus esse non audio: non tu dicis. cum enim movetur corpus, tempore metior, quamdiu moveatur, ex quo moveri incipit, donec desinat. et si non vidi, ex quo coepit, et perseverat moveri, ut non videam, cum desinit, non valeo metiri, nisi forte ex quo videre incipio, donec desinam. quod si diu video, tantummodo longum tempus esse renuntio, non autem, quantum sit, quia et quantum cum dicimus, conlatione dicimus, velut: tantum hoc, quantum illud aut: duplum hoc ad illud et si quid aliud isto modo. si autem notare potuerimus locorum spatia, unde et quo veniat corpus, quod movetur, vel partes eius, si tamquam in torno movetur, possumus dicere, quantum sit temporis, ex quo ab illo loco usque ad illum locum motus corporis vel partis eius effectus est. cum itaque aliud sit motus corporis, aliud, quo metimur quamdiu sit, quis non sentiat, quid horum potius tempus dicendum sit? nam si et varie corpus aliquando movetur, aliquando stat, non solum motum eius, sed etiam statum tempore metimur et dicimus: tantum stetit, quantum motum est aut: duplo vel triplo stetit ad id quod motum est et si quid aliud nostra dimensio sive conprehenderit sive existimaverit, ut dici solet plus minus. non ergo tempus corporis motus.
Et confiteor tibi, domine, ignorare me adhuc, quid sit tempus, et rursus confiteor tibi, domine, scire me in tempore ista dicere, et diu me iam loqui de tempore, atque ipsum diu non esse diu nisi mora temporis. quomodo igitur hoc scio, quando quid sit tempus nescio? an forte nescio, quemadmodum dicam quod scio? ei mihi, qui nescio saltem quid nesciam! ecce, deus meus, coram te, quia non mentior: sicut loquor, ita est cor meum. tu inluminabis lucernam meam, domine, deus meus, inluminabis tenebras meas.
Nonne tibi confitetur anima mea confessione veridica metiri me tempora? ita, domine deus meus, metior et quid metiar nescio. metior motum corporis tempore. item ipsum tempus nonne metior? an vero corporis motum metirer, quamdiu sit et quamdiu hinc illuc perveniat, nisi tempus, in quo movetur, metirer? ipsum ergo tempus unde metior? an tempore breviore metimur longius, sicut spatio cubiti spatium transtri? sic enim videmus spatio brevis syllabae metiri spatium longae syllabae atque id duplum dicere. ita metimur spatia carminum spatiis versuum, et spatia versuum spatiis pedum, et spatia pedum spatiis syllabarum, et spatia longarum spatiis brevium: non in paginis -- nam eo modo loca metimur, non tempora -- sed cum voces pronuntiando transeunt, et dicimus: longum carmen est, nam tot versibus contexitur; longi versus, nam tot pedibus constant; longi pedes, nam tot syllabis tenduntur; longa syllaba est, nam dupla est ad brevem. sed neque ita comprehenditur certa mensura temporis, quandoquidem fieri potest, ut ampliore spatio temporis personet versus brevior, si productius pronuntietur, quam longior, si correptius. ita carmen, ita pes, ita syllaba. inde mihi visum est nihil esse aliud tempus quam distentionem: sed cuius rei, nescio, et mirum, si non ipsius animi. quid enim metior, obsecro, deus meus, et dico aut indefinite: longius est hoc tempus quam illud aut etiam definite: duplum est hoc ad illud? tempus metior, scio; sed non metior futurum, quia nondum est, non metior praesens, quia nullo spatio tenditur, non metior praeteritum, quia iam non est. quid ergo metior? an praetereuntia tempora, non praeterita? sic enim dixeram.
Insiste, anime meus, et adtende fortiter: deus adiutor noster; ipse fecit nos, et non nos. adtende, ubi albescet veritas. ecce puta vox corporis incipit sonare et sonat et ecce desinit, iamque silentium est, et vox illa praeterita est et non est iam vox. futura erat, antequam sonaret, et non poterat metiri, quia nondum erat, et nunc non potest, quia tunc erat, quae metiri posset. sed et tunc non stabat; ibat enim et praeteriebat. an ideo magis poterat? praeteriens enim tendebatur in aliquod spatium temporis, quo metiri posset, quoniam praesens nullum habet spatium. si ergo tunc poterat, ecce puta altera coepit sonare et adhuc sonat continuato tenore sine ulla distinctione: metiamur eam, dum sonat; cum enim sonare cessaverit, iam praeterita erit et non erit, quae possit metiri. metiamur plane et dicamus, quanta sit. sed adhuc sonat, nec metiri potest nisi ab initio sui, quo sonare coepit, usque ad finem, quo desinit. ipsum quippe intervallum metimur ab aliquo initio usque ad aliquem finem. quapropter vox, quae numquam finita est, metiri non potest, ut dicatur, quam longa vel brevis sit, nec dici aut aequalis alicui, aut ad aliquam simpla vel dupla, vel quid aliud. cum autem finita fuerit, iam non erit. quo pacto igitur metiri poterit? et metimur tamen tempora, nec ea, quae nondum sunt, nec ea, quae iam non sunt, nec ea, quae nulla mora extenduntur, nec ea, quae terminos non habent. nec futura ergo nec praeterita nec praesentia nec praetereuntia tempora metimur, et metimur tamen tempora. Deus creator omnium: versus iste octo syllabarum brevibus et longis alternat syllabis: quattuor itaque breves, prima, tertia, quinta, septima, simplae sunt ad quattuor longas, secundam, quartam, sextam, octavam. hae singulae ad illas singulas duplum habent temporis; pronuntio et renuntio, et ita est, quantum sentitur sensu manifesto. quantum sensus manifestus est, brevi syllaba longam metior eamque sentio habere bis tantum. sed cum altera post alteram sonat, si prior brevis, longa posterior, quomodo tenebo brevem, et quomodo eam longae metiens applicabo, ut inveniam, quod bis tantum habeat, quandoquidem longa sonare non incipit, nisi brevis sonare destiterit? ipsamque longam num praesentem metior, quando nisi finitam non metior? eius enim finitio praeteritio est. quid ergo est, quod metior? ubi est qua metior brevis? ubi est longa, quam metior? ambae sonuerunt, avolaverunt, praeterierunt, iam non sunt: et ego metior, fidenterque respondeo, quantum exercitato sensu fiditur, illam simplam esse, illam duplam, in spatio scilicet temporis. neque hoc possum, nisi quia praeterierunt et finitae sunt. non ergo ipsas, quae iam non sunt, sed aliquid in memoria mea metior, quod infixum manet. In te, anime meus, tempora mea metior. noli mihi obstrepere; quod est, noli tibi obstrepere turbis affectionum tuarum. in te, inquam, tempora metior. affectionem, quam res praetereuntes in te faciunt, et cum illae praeterierint, manet, ipsam metior praesentem, non ea quae praeterierunt, ut fieret; ipsam metior, cum tempora metior. ergo aut ipsa sunt tempora, aut non tempora metior. quid cum metimur silentia, et dicimus illud silentium tantum tenuisse temporis, quantum illa vox tenuit, nonne cogitationem tendimus ad mensuram vocis, quasi sonaret, ut aliquid de intervallis silentiorum in spatio temporis renuntiare possimus? nam et voce atque ore cessante, peragimus cogitando carmina et versus, et quemque sermonem motionumque dimensiones quaslibet, et de spatiis temporum, quantum illud ad illud sit, renuntiamus non aliter, ac si ea sonando diceremus. si voluerit aliquis edere longiusculam vocem, et constituerit praemeditando, quam longa futura sit, egit utique iste spatium temporis in silentio, memoriaeque commendans coepit edere illam vocem, quae sonat, donec ad propositum terminum perducatur: immo sonuit et sonabit; nam quod eius iam peractum est, utique sonuit, quod autem restat, sonabit, atque ita peragitur, dum praesens intentio futurum in praeteritum traicit, deminutione futuri crescente praeterito, donec consumptione futuri sit totum praeteritum.
Sed quomodo minuitur aut consumitur futurum, quod nondum est, aut quomodo crescit praeteritum, quod iam non est, nisi quia in animo, qui illud agit, tria sunt? nam et expectat per id quod adtendit transeat in id quod meminerit. quis igitur negat futura nondum esse? sed tamen iam est in animo expectatio futurorum. et quis negat praeterita iam non esse? sed tamen est adhuc in animo memoria praeteritorum. et quis negat praesens tempus carere spatio, quia in puncto praeterit? sed tamen perdurat attentio, per quam pergat abesse quod aderit. non igitur longum tempus futurum, quod non est, sed longum futurum longa expectatio futuri est, neque longum praeteritum tempus, quod non est, sed longum praeteritum longa memoria praeteriti est. Dicturus sum canticum, quod novi: antequam incipiam, in totum expectatio mea tenditur, cum autem coepero, quantum ex illa in praeteritum decerpsero, tenditur et memoria mea, atque distenditur vita huius actionis meae, in memoriam propter quod dixi, et in expectationem propter quod dicturus sum: praesens tamen adest attentio mea, per quam traicitur quod erat futurum, ut fiat praeteritum. quod quanto magis agitur et agitur, tanto breviata expectatione prolongatur memoria, donec tota expectatio consumatur, quum tota illa actio finita transierit in memoriam. et quod in toto cantico, hoc in singulis particulis eius, fit atque in singulis syllabis eius, hoc in actione longiore, cuius forte particula est illud canticum, hoc in tota vita hominis, cuius partes sunt omnes actiones hominis, hoc in toto saeculo filiorum hominum, cuius partes sunt omnes vitae hominum.
Sed quondam melior est misericordia tua super vitas, ecce distentio est vita mea, et me suscepit dextera tua in domino meo, mediatore filio hominis inter te unum et nos multos, in multis per multa, ut per eum adprehendam, in quo et adprehensus sum, et a veteribus diebus colligar sequens unum, praeterita oblitus, non in ea quae futura et transitura sunt, sed in ea quae ante sunt non distentus, sed extentus, non secundum distentionem, sed secundum intentionem sequor ad palmam supernae vocationis, ubi audiam vocem laudis et contempler delectationem tuam nec venientem nec praetereuntem. nunc vero anni mei in gemitibus, et tu solacium meum, domine, pater meus aeternus es; at ego in tempora dissilui, quorum ordinem nescio, et tumultuosis varietatibus dilaniantur cogitationes meae, intima viscera animae meae, donec in te confluam purgatus et liquidus igne amoris tui.
Et stabo atque solidabor in te, in forma mea, veritate tua, nec patiar quaestiones hominum, qui poenali morbo plus sitiunt, quam capiunt, et dicunt: quid faciebat deus, antequam faceret caelum et terram? aut quid ei venit in mentem, ut aliquid facerit, cum antea numquam aliquid fecerit? da illis, domine, bene cogitare, quid dicant, et invenire, quia non dicitur numquam, ubi non est tempus. qui ergo dicitur numquam fecisse, quid aliud dicitur nisi nullo tempore fecisse? videant itaque nullum tempus esse posse sine creatura, et desinant istam vanitatem loqui. extendantur etiam in ea, quae ante sunt, et intellegant te ante omnia tempora aeternum creatorem omnium temporum, neque ulla tempora tibi esse coaeterna, nec ullam creaturam, etiamsi est aliqua supra tempora.
Domine deus meus, quis ille sinus est alti secreti tui et quam longe inde me proiecerunt consequentia delictorum meorum? sana oculos meos, et congaudeam luci tuae. certe si est tam grandi scientia et praescientia pollens animus, cui cuncta praeterita et futura ita nota sint, sicut mihi unum canticum notissimum, nimium mirabilis est animus iste atque ad horrorem stupendus, quippe quem ita non lateat quidquid peractum et quidquid relicum saeculorum est, quemadmodum me non latet cantantem illud canticum, quid et quantum eius abierit ab exordio, quid et quantum restet ad finem. sed absit, ut tu, conditor universitatis, conditor animarum et corporum, absit, ut ita noveris omnia futura et praeterita. longe tu, longe mirabilius longeque secretius. neque enim sicut nota cantantis notumve canticum audientis expectatione vocum futurarum et memoria praeteritarum variatur affectus sensusque distenditur, ita tibi aliquid accidit inconmutabiliter aeterno, hoc est vere aeterno creatori mentium. sicut ergo nosti in principio caelum et terram sine varietate notitiae tuae, ita fecisti in principio caelum et terram sine distinctione actionis tuae. qui intellegit, confiteatur tibi, et qui non intellegit, confiteatur tibi. o quam excelsus es, et humiles corde sunt domus tua! tu enim erigis elisos, et non cadunt, quorum celsitudo tu es.
See, I answer him that asketh, "What did God before He made heaven and earth?" I answer not as one is said to have done merrily (eluding the pressure of the question), "He was preparing hell (saith he) for pryers into mysteries." It is one thing to answer enquiries, another to make sport of enquirers. So I answer not; for rather had I answer, "I know not," what I know not, than so as to raise a laugh at him who asketh deep things and gain praise for one who answereth false things. But I say that Thou, our God, art the Creator of every creature: and if by the name "heaven and earth," every creature be understood; I boldly say, "that before God made heaven and earth, He did not make any thing." For if He made, what did He make but a creature? And would I knew whatsoever I desire to know to my profit, as I know, that no creature was made, before there was made any creature.
But if any excursive brain rove over the images of forepassed times, and wonder that Thou the God Almighty and All-creating and All-supporting, Maker of heaven and earth, didst for innumerable ages forbear from so great a work, before Thou wouldest make it; let him awake and consider, that he wonders at false conceits. For whence could innumerable ages pass by, which Thou madest not, Thou the Author and Creator of all ages? or what times should there be, which were not made by Thee? or how should they pass by, if they never were? Seeing then Thou art the Creator of all times, if any time was before Thou madest heaven and earth, why say they that Thou didst forego working? For that very time didst Thou make, nor could times pass by, before Thou madest those times. But if before heaven and earth there was no time, why is it demanded, what Thou then didst? For there was no "then," when there was no time.
Nor dost Thou by time, precede time: else shouldest Thou not precede all times. But Thou precedest all things past, by the sublimity of an ever-present eternity; and surpassest all future because they are future, and when they come, they shall be past; but Thou art the Same, and Thy years fail not. Thy years neither come nor go; whereas ours both come and go, that they all may come. Thy years stand together, because they do stand; nor are departing thrust out by coming years, for they pass not away; but ours shall all be, when they shall no more be. Thy years are one day; and Thy day is not daily, but To-day, seeing Thy To-day gives not place unto to-morrow, for neither doth it replace yesterday. Thy To-day, is Eternity; therefore didst Thou beget The Coeternal, to whom Thou saidst, This day have I begotten Thee. Thou hast made all things; and before all times Thou art: neither in any time was time not.
At no time then hadst Thou not made any thing, because time itself Thou madest. And no times are coeternal with Thee, because Thou abidest; but if they abode, they should not be times. For what is time? Who can readily and briefly explain this? Who can even in thought comprehend it, so as to utter a word about it? But what in discourse do we mention more familiarly and knowingly, than time? And, we understand, when we speak of it; we understand also, when we hear it spoken of by another. What then is time? If no one asks me, I know: if I wish to explain it to one that asketh, I know not: yet I say boldly that I know, that if nothing passed away, time past were not; and if nothing were coming, a time to come were not; and if nothing were, time present were not. Those two times then, past and to come, how are they, seeing the past now is not, and that to come is not yet? But the present, should it always be present, and never pass into time past, verily it should not be time, but eternity. If time present (if it is to be time) only cometh into existence, because it passeth into time past, how can we say that either this is, whose cause of being is, that it shall not be; so, namely, that we cannot truly say that time is, but because it is tending not to be?
And yet we say, "a long time" and "a short time"; still, only of time past or to come. A long time past (for example) we call an hundred years since; and a long time to come, an hundred years hence. But a short time past, we call (suppose) often days since; and a short time to come, often days hence. But in what sense is that long or short, which is not? For the past, is not now; and the future, is not yet. Let us not then say, "it is long"; but of the past, "it hath been long"; and of the future, "it will be long." O my Lord, my Light, shall not here also Thy Truth mock at man? For that past time which was long, was it long when it was now past, or when it was yet present? For then might it be long, when there was, what could be long; but when past, it was no longer; wherefore neither could that be long, which was not at all. Let us not then say, "time past hath been long": for we shall not find, what hath been long, seeing that since it was past, it is no more, but let us say, "that present time was long"; because, when it was present, it was long. For it had not yet passed away, so as not to be; and therefore there was, what could be long; but after it was past, that ceased also to be long, which ceased to be.
Let us see then, thou soul of man, whether present time can be long: for to thee it is given to feel and to measure length of time. What wilt thou answer me? Are an hundred years, when present, a long time? See first, whether an hundred years can be present. For if the first of these years be now current, it is present, but the other ninety and nine are to come, and therefore are not yet, but if the second year be current, one is now past, another present, the rest to come. And so if we assume any middle year of this hundred to be present, all before it, are past; all after it, to come; wherefore an hundred years cannot be present. But see at least whether that one which is now current, itself is present; for if the current month be its first, the rest are to come; if the second, the first is already past, and the rest are not yet. Therefore, neither is the year now current present; and if not present as a whole, then is not the year present. For twelve months are a year; of which whatever by the current month is present; the rest past, or to come. Although neither is that current month present; but one day only; the rest being to come, if it be the first; past, if the last; if any of the middle, then amid past and to come.
See how the present time, which alone we found could be called long, is abridged to the length scarce of one day. But let us examine that also; because neither is one day present as a whole. For it is made up of four and twenty hours of night and day: of which, the first hath the rest to come; the last hath them past; and any of the middle hath those before it past, those behind it to come. Yea, that one hour passeth away in flying particles. Whatsoever of it hath flown away, is past; whatsoever remaineth, is to come. If an instant of time be conceived, which cannot be divided into the smallest particles of moments, that alone is it, which may be called present. Which yet flies with such speed from future to past, as not to be lengthened out with the least stay. For if it be, it is divided into past and future. The present hath no space. Where then is the time, which we may call long? Is it to come? Of it we do not say, "it is long"; because it is not yet, so as to be long; but we say, "it will be long." When therefore will it be? For if even then, when it is yet to come, it shall not be long (because what can be long, as yet is not), and so it shall then be long, when from future which as yet is not, it shall begin now to be, and have become present, that so there should exist what may be long; then does time present cry out in the words above, that it cannot be long.
And yet, Lord, we perceive intervals of times, and compare them, and say, some are shorter, and others longer. We measure also, how much longer or shorter this time is than that; and we answer, "This is double, or treble; and that, but once, or only just so much as that." But we measure times as they are passing, by perceiving them; but past, which now are not, or the future, which are not yet, who can measure? unless a man shall presume to say, that can be measured, which is not. When then time is passing, it may be perceived and measured; but when it is past, it cannot, because it is not.
I ask, Father, I affirm not: O my God, rule and guide me. "Who will tell me that there are not three times (as we learned when boys, and taught boys), past, present, and future; but present only, because those two are not? Or are they also; and when from future it becometh present, doth it come out of some secret place; and so, when retiring, from present it becometh past? For where did they, who foretold things to come, see them, if as yet they be not? For that which is not, cannot be seen. And they who relate things past, could not relate them, if in mind they did not discern them, and if they were not, they could no way be discerned. Things then past and to come, are."
Permit me, Lord, to seek further. O my hope, let not my purpose be confounded. For if times past and to come be, I would know where they be. Which yet if I cannot, yet I know, wherever they be, they are not there as future, or past, but present. For if there also they be future, they are not yet there; if there also they be past, they are no longer there. Wheresoever then is whatsoever is, it is only as present. Although when past facts are related, there are drawn out of the memory, not the things themselves which are past, but words which, conceived by the images of the things, they, in passing, have through the senses left as traces in the mind. Thus my childhood, which now is not, is in time past, which now is not: but now when I recall its image, and tell of it, I behold it in the present, because it is still in my memory. Whether there be a like cause of foretelling things to come also; that of things which as yet are not, the images may be perceived before, already existing, I confess, O my God, I know not. This indeed I know, that we generally think before on our future actions, and that that forethinking is present, but the action whereof we forethink is not yet, because it is to come. Which, when we have set upon, and have begun to do what we were forethinking, then shall that action be; because then it is no longer future, but present.
Which way soever then this secret fore-perceiving of things to come be; that only can be seen, which is. But what now is, is not future, but present. When then things to come are said to be seen, it is not themselves which as yet are not (that is, which are to be), but their causes perchance or signs are seen, which already are. Therefore they are not future but present to those who now see that, from which the future, being foreconceived in the mind, is foretold. Which fore-conceptions again now are; and those who foretell those things, do behold the conceptions present before them. Let now the numerous variety of things furnish me some example. I behold the day-break, I foreshow, that the sun, is about to rise. What I behold, is present; what I foresignify, to come; not the sun, which already is; but the sun-rising, which is not yet. And yet did I not in my mind imagine the sun-rising itself (as now while I speak of it), I could not foretell it. But neither is that day-break which I discern in the sky, the sun-rising, although it goes before it; nor that imagination of my mind; which two are seen now present, that the other which is to be may be foretold. Future things then are not yet: and if they be not yet, they are not: and if they are not, they cannot be seen; yet foretold they may be from things present, which are already, and are seen.
Thou then, Ruler of Thy creation, by what way dost Thou teach souls things to come? For Thou didst teach Thy Prophets. By what way dost Thou, to whom nothing is to come, teach things to come; or rather of the future, dost teach things present? For, what is not, neither can it be taught. Too far is this way of my ken: it is too mighty for me, I cannot attain unto it; but from Thee I can, when Thou shalt vouchsafe it, O sweet light of my hidden eyes.
What now is clear and plain is, that neither things to come nor past are. Nor is it properly said, "there be three times, past, present, and to come": yet perchance it might be properly said, "there be three times; a present of things past, a present of things present, and a present of things future." For these three do exist in some sort, in the soul, but otherwhere do I not see them; present of things past, memory; present of things present, sight; present of things future, expectation. If thus we be permitted to speak, I see three times, and I confess there are three. Let it be said too, "there be three times, past, present, and to come": in our incorrect way. See, I object not, nor gainsay, nor find fault, if what is so said be but understood, that neither what is to be, now is, nor what is past. For but few things are there, which we speak properly, most things improperly; still the things intended are understood.
I said then even now, we measure times as they pass, in order to be able to say, this time is twice so much as that one; or, this is just so much as that; and so of any other parts of time, which be measurable. Wherefore, as I said, we measure times as they pass. And if any should ask me, "How knowest thou?" I might answer, "I know, that we do measure, nor can we measure things that are not; and things past and to come, are not." But time present how do we measure, seeing it hath no space? It is measured while passing, but when it shall have passed, it is not measured; for there will be nothing to be measured. But whence, by what way, and whither passes it while it is a measuring? whence, but from the future? Which way, but through the present? whither, but into the past? From that therefore, which is not yet, through that, which hath no space, into that, which now is not. Yet what do we measure, if not time in some space? For we do not say, single, and double, and triple, and equal, or any other like way that we speak of time, except of spaces of times. In what space then do we measure time passing? In the future, whence it passeth through? But what is not yet, we measure not. Or in the present, by which it passes? but no space, we do not measure: or in the past, to which it passes? But neither do we measure that, which now is not.
My soul is on fire to know this most intricate enigma. Shut it not up, O Lord my God, good Father; through Christ I beseech Thee, do not shut up these usual, yet hidden things, from my desire, that it be hindered from piercing into them; but let them dawn through Thy enlightening mercy, O Lord. Whom shall I enquire of concerning these things? and to whom shall I more fruitfully confess my ignorance, than to Thee, to Whom these my studies, so vehemently kindled toward Thy Scriptures, are not troublesome? Give what I love; for I do love, and this hast Thou given me. Give, Father, Who truly knowest to give good gifts unto Thy children. Give, because I have taken upon me to know, and trouble is before me until Thou openest it. By Christ I beseech Thee, in His Name, Holy of holies, let no man disturb me. For I believed, and therefore do I speak. This is my hope, for this do I live, that I may contemplate the delights of the Lord. Behold, Thou hast made my days old, and they pass away, and how, I know not. And we talk of time, and time, and times, and times, "How long time is it since he said this"; "how long time since he did this"; and "how long time since I saw that"; and "this syllable hath double time to that single short syllable." These words we speak, and these we hear, and are understood, and understand. Most manifest and ordinary they are, and the self-same things again are but too deeply hidden, and the discovery of them were new.
I heard once from a learned man, that the motions of the sun, moon, and stars, constituted time, and I assented not. For why should not the motions of all bodies rather be times? Or, if the lights of heaven should cease, and a potter's wheel run round, should there be no time by which we might measure those whirlings, and say, that either it moved with equal pauses, or if it turned sometimes slower, otherwhiles quicker, that some rounds were longer, other shorter? Or, while we were saying this, should we not also be speaking in time? Or, should there in our words be some syllables short, others long, but because those sounded in a shorter time, these in a longer? God, grant to men to see in a small thing notices common to things great and small. The stars and lights of heaven, are also for signs, and for seasons, and for years, and for days; they are; yet neither should I say, that the going round of that wooden wheel was a day, nor yet he, that it was therefore no time.
I desire to know the force and nature of time, by which we measure the motions of bodies, and say (for example) this motion is twice as long as that. For I ask, Seeing "day" denotes not the stay only of the sun upon the earth (according to which day is one thing, night another); but also its whole circuit from east to east again; according to which we say, "there passed so many days," the night being included when we say, "so many days," and the nights not reckoned apart;—seeing then a day is completed by the motion of the sun and by his circuit from east to east again, I ask, does the motion alone make the day, or the stay in which that motion is completed, or both? For if the first be the day; then should we have a day, although the sun should finish that course in so small a space of time, as one hour comes to. If the second, then should not that make a day, if between one sun-rise and another there were but so short a stay, as one hour comes to; but the sun must go four and twenty times about, to complete one day. If both, then neither could that be called a day; if the sun should run his whole round in the space of one hour; nor that, if, while the sun stood still, so much time should overpass, as the sun usually makes his whole course in, from morning to morning. I will not therefore now ask, what that is which is called day; but, what time is, whereby we, measuring the circuit of the sun, should say that it was finished in half the time it was wont, if so be it was finished in so small a space as twelve hours; and comparing both times, should call this a single time, that a double time; even supposing the sun to run his round from east to east, sometimes in that single, sometimes in that double time. Let no man then tell me, that the motions of the heavenly bodies constitute times, because, when at the prayer of one, the sun had stood still, till he could achieve his victorious battle, the sun stood still, but time went on. For in its own allotted space of time was that battle waged and ended. I perceive time then to be a certain extension. But do I perceive it, or seem to perceive it? Thou, Light and Truth, wilt show me.
Dost Thou bid me assent, if any define time to be "motion of a body?" Thou dost not bid me. For that no body is moved, but in time, I hear; this Thou sayest; but that the motion of a body is time, I hear not; Thou sayest it not. For when a body is moved, I by time measure, how long it moveth, from the time it began to move until it left off? And if I did not see whence it began; and it continue to move so that I see not when it ends, I cannot measure, save perchance from the time I began, until I cease to see. And if I look long, I can only pronounce it to be a long time, but not how long; because when we say "how long," we do it by comparison; as, "this is as long as that," or "twice so long as that," or the like. But when we can mark the distances of the places, whence and whither goeth the body moved, or his parts, if it moved as in a lathe, then can we say precisely, in how much time the motion of that body or his part, from this place unto that, was finished. Seeing therefore the motion of a body is one thing, that by which we measure how long it is, another; who sees not, which of the two is rather to be called time? For and if a body be sometimes moved, sometimes stands still, then we measure, not his motion only, but his standing still too by time; and we say, "it stood still, as much as it moved"; or "it stood still twice or thrice so long as it moved"; or any other space which our measuring hath either ascertained, or guessed; more or less, as we use to say. Time then is not the motion of a body.
And I confess to Thee, O Lord, that I yet know not what time is, and again I confess unto Thee, O Lord, that I know that I speak this in time, and that having long spoken of time, that very "long" is not long, but by the pause of time. How then know I this, seeing I know not what time is? or is it perchance that I know not how to express what I know? Woe is me, that do not even know, what I know not. Behold, O my God, before Thee I lie not; but as I speak, so is my heart. Thou shalt light my candle; Thou, O Lord my God, wilt enlighten my darkness.
Does not my soul most truly confess unto Thee, that I do measure times? Do I then measure, O my God, and know not what I measure? I measure the motion of a body in time; and the time itself do I not measure? Or could I indeed measure the motion of a body how long it were, and in how long space it could come from this place to that, without measuring the time in which it is moved? This same time then, how do I measure? do we by a shorter time measure a longer, as by the space of a cubit, the space of a rood? for so indeed we seem by the space of a short syllable, to measure the space of a long syllable, and to say that this is double the other. Thus measure we the spaces of stanzas, by the spaces of the verses, and the spaces of the verses, by the spaces of the feet, and the spaces of the feet, by the spaces of the syllables, and the spaces of long, by the space of short syllables; not measuring by pages (for then we measure spaces, not times); but when we utter the words and they pass by, and we say "it is a long stanza," because composed of so many verses; long verses, because consisting of so many feet; long feet, because prolonged by so many syllables; a long syllable because double to a short one. But neither do we this way obtain any certain measure of time; because it may be, that a shorter verse, pronounced more fully, may take up more time than a longer, pronounced hurriedly. And so for a verse, a foot, a syllable. Whence it seemed to me, that time is nothing else than protraction; but of what, I know not; and I marvel, if it be not of the mind itself? For what, I beseech Thee, O my God, do I measure, when I say, either indefinitely "this is a longer time than that," or definitely "this is double that"? That I measure time, I know; and yet I measure not time to come, for it is not yet; nor present, because it is not protracted by any space; nor past, because it now is not. What then do I measure? Times passing, not past? for so I said.
Courage, my mind, and press on mightily. God is our helper, He made us, and not we ourselves. Press on where truth begins to dawn. Suppose, now, the voice of a body begins to sound, and does sound, and sounds on, and list, it ceases; it is silence now, and that voice is past, and is no more a voice. Before it sounded, it was to come, and could not be measured, because as yet it was not, and now it cannot, because it is no longer. Then therefore while it sounded, it might; because there then was what might be measured. But yet even then it was not at a stay; for it was passing on, and passing away. Could it be measured the rather, for that? For while passing, it was being extended into some space of time, so that it might be measured, since the present hath no space. If therefore then it might, then, lo, suppose another voice hath begun to sound, and still soundeth in one continued tenor without any interruption; let us measure it while it sounds; seeing when it hath left sounding, it will then be past, and nothing left to be measured; let us measure it verily, and tell how much it is. But it sounds still, nor can it be measured but from the instant it began in, unto the end it left in. For the very space between is the thing we measure, namely, from some beginning unto some end. Wherefore, a voice that is not yet ended, cannot be measured, so that it may be said how long, or short it is; nor can it be called equal to another, or double to a single, or the like. But when ended, it no longer is. How may it then be measured? And yet we measure times; but yet neither those which are not yet, nor those which no longer are, nor those which are not lengthened out by some pause, nor those which have no bounds. We measure neither times to come, nor past, nor present, nor passing; and yet we do measure times.
"Deus Creator omnium," this verse of eight syllables alternates between short and long syllables. The four short then, the first, third, fifth, and seventh, are but single, in respect of the four long, the second, fourth, sixth, and eighth. Every one of these to every one of those, hath a double time: I pronounce them, report on them, and find it so, as one's plain sense perceives. By plain sense then, I measure a long syllable by a short, and I sensibly find it to have twice so much; but when one sounds after the other, if the former be short, the latter long, how shall I detain the short one, and how, measuring, shall I apply it to the long, that I may find this to have twice so much; seeing the long does not begin to sound, unless the short leaves sounding? And that very long one do I measure as present, seeing I measure it not till it be ended? Now his ending is his passing away. What then is it I measure? where is the short syllable by which I measure? where the long which I measure? Both have sounded, have flown, passed away, are no more; and yet I measure, and confidently answer (so far as is presumed on a practised sense) that as to space of time this syllable is but single, that double. And yet I could not do this, unless they were already past and ended. It is not then themselves, which now are not, that I measure, but something in my memory, which there remains fixed.
It is in thee, my mind, that I measure times. Interrupt me not, that is, interrupt not thyself with the tumults of thy impressions. In thee I measure times; the impression, which things as they pass by cause in thee, remains even when they are gone; this it is which still present, I measure, not the things which pass by to make this impression. This I measure, when I measure times. Either then this is time, or I do not measure times. What when we measure silence, and say that this silence hath held as long time as did that voice? do we not stretch out our thought to the measure of a voice, as if it sounded, that so we may be able to report of the intervals of silence in a given space of time? For though both voice and tongue be still, yet in thought we go over poems, and verses, and any other discourse, or dimensions of motions, and report as to the spaces of times, how much this is in respect of that, no otherwise than if vocally we did pronounce them. If a man would utter a lengthened sound, and had settled in thought how long it should be, he hath in silence already gone through a space of time, and committing it to memory, begins to utter that speech, which sounds on, until it be brought unto the end proposed. Yea it hath sounded, and will sound; for so much of it as is finished, hath sounded already, and the rest will sound. And thus passeth it on, until the present intent conveys over the future into the past; the past increasing by the diminution of the future, until by the consumption of the future, all is past.
But how is that future diminished or consumed, which as yet is not? or how that past increased, which is now no longer, save that in the mind which enacteth this, there be three things done? For it expects, it considers, it remembers; that so that which it expecteth, through that which it considereth, passeth into that which it remembereth. Who therefore denieth, that things to come are not as yet? and yet, there is in the mind an expectation of things to come. And who denies past things to be now no longer? and yet is there still in the mind a memory of things past. And who denieth the present time hath no space, because it passeth away in a moment? and yet our consideration continueth, through which that which shall be present proceedeth to become absent. It is not then future time, that is long, for as yet it is not: but a long future, is "a long expectation of the future," nor is it time past, which now is not, that is long; but a long past, is "a long memory of the past."
I am about to repeat a Psalm that I know. Before I begin, my expectation is extended over the whole; but when I have begun, how much soever of it I shall separate off into the past, is extended along my memory; thus the life of this action of mine is divided between my memory as to what I have repeated, and expectation as to what I am about to repeat; but "consideration" is present with me, that through it what was future, may be conveyed over, so as to become past. Which the more it is done again and again, so much the more the expectation being shortened, is the memory enlarged: till the whole expectation be at length exhausted, when that whole action being ended, shall have passed into memory. And this which takes place in the whole Psalm, the same takes place in each several portion of it, and each several syllable; the same holds in that longer action, whereof this Psalm may be part; the same holds in the whole life of man, whereof all the actions of man are parts; the same holds through the whole age of the sons of men, whereof all the lives of men are parts.
But because Thy loving-kindness is better than all lives, behold, my life is but a distraction, and Thy right hand upheld me, in my Lord the Son of man, the Mediator betwixt Thee, The One, and us many, many also through our manifold distractions amid many things, that by Him I may apprehend in Whom I have been apprehended, and may be re-collected from my old conversation, to follow The One, forgetting what is behind, and not distended but extended, not to things which shall be and shall pass away, but to those things which are before, not distractedly but intently, I follow on for the prize of my heavenly calling, where I may hear the voice of Thy praise, and contemplate Thy delights, neither to come, nor to pass away. But now are my years spent in mourning. And Thou, O Lord, art my comfort, my Father everlasting, but I have been severed amid times, whose order I know not; and my thoughts, even the inmost bowels of my soul, are rent and mangled with tumultuous varieties, until I flow together into Thee, purified and molten by the fire of Thy love.
And now will I stand, and become firm in Thee, in my mould, Thy truth; nor will I endure the questions of men, who by a penal disease thirst for more than they can contain, and say, "what did God before He made heaven and earth?" Or, "How came it into His mind to make any thing, having never before made any thing?" Give them, O Lord, well to bethink themselves what they say, and to find, that "never" cannot be predicated, when "time" is not. This then that He is said "never to have made"; what else is it to say, than "in 'no time' to have made?" Let them see therefore, that time cannot be without created being, and cease to speak that vanity. May they also be extended towards those things which are before; and understand Thee before all times, the eternal Creator of all times, and that no times be coeternal with Thee, nor any creature, even if there be any creature before all times.
O Lord my God, what a depth is that recess of Thy mysteries, and how far from it have the consequences of my transgressions cast me! Heal mine eyes, that I may share the joy of Thy light. Certainly, if there be mind gifted with such vast knowledge and foreknowledge, as to know all things past and to come, as I know one well-known Psalm, truly that mind is passing wonderful, and fearfully amazing; in that nothing past, nothing to come in after-ages, is any more hidden from him, than when I sung that Psalm, was hidden from me what, and how much of it had passed away from the beginning, what, and how much there remained unto the end. But far be it that Thou the Creator of the Universe, the Creator of souls and bodies, far be it, that Thou shouldest in such wise know all things past and to come. Far, far more wonderfully, and far more mysteriously, dost Thou know them. For not, as the feelings of one who singeth what he knoweth, or heareth some well-known song, are through expectation of the words to come, and the remembering of those that are past, varied, and his senses divided,—not so doth any thing happen unto Thee, unchangeably eternal, that is, the eternal Creator of minds. Like then as Thou in the Beginning knewest the heaven and the earth, without any variety of Thy knowledge, so madest Thou in the Beginning heaven and earth, without any distraction of Thy action. Whoso understandeth, let him confess unto Thee; and whoso understandeth not, let him confess unto Thee. Oh how high art Thou, and yet the humble in heart are Thy dwelling-place; for Thou raisest up those that are bowed down, and they fall not, whose elevation Thou art.
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